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c=preensive stay of this fascinating suhi' t
would examine in rAich greater detail the depth of the political and
social structure of Indonesia. To do this a researcher would need
a readi:1= 1:-.wledge of he Dutch and Indonesian languages as mcst
primary . ,f-ce material is i these native tongues. This author
does not have this skill. esearch for this wcrk has been
accomplished in the Wasson collection of Cornell University's
11.17,r3ry, the Army War College library and the libraries of
Western Kentucky University and the United States Military Academy
at West Point, New York.
A deliberate obscurity, preserved by Indonesia with
regard to elemental military facts has forced the author in some
instances to draw on normally accessible sources whose reliability
of information is not always certain.
I am deeply indebted to Dr. A. Guy Hope of Western
Kentucky University's Department of Government for his patience
and firm counsel and to Miss Connie Wilson of Western Kentucky
University's Military Science Department for editorial and
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Ti 3 7c.I. of world lorlay, a
viewer one hundred years hence would certainly notice its many
revolutionary characteristics. Perhaps the most i7nortant of these
relate: to ndti:nal:sm rodarniz-t-n,
the which ha:, rE,ltcd ir _,e
formation of many n. nation-, within tne last twenty years, led
by Western-train e.'] intellectuals in many cases. These new leaders
have been faced with :he 7rohlem that their fellow countrymen do
not necessarily share their beliefs in or understanding of
nationalism.
The leaders, many of them young, have had to become
nation-builders in order to construct political units within the
gcographic boundaries of their new states. It often appears that
the masses within these new nations have first loyalties to their
tribes, religious units, racial or linguistic groups, or
particular regions.
Confronted with these facts, the leadership of many new
countries has used native military forces to help build a national
consensus. An army has unique characteristics which may aid or
detract from the formation of a sense of national consentus and
a devotion to, national symbols. Within an army the officer corps
is its mind and it heart. An understanding of this select group
can provide useful ir:7ights into the ideolorjcal icots cf any army.
2
In mis -;tuly the author describe the role of the
IlItary in ,Aldcrdevelc-:,ed countries. The essay will then examine
factors which contributed ts the
- _ 1: • fec7raical
,thnic, cultural and psychological elements have left
a very definite mark on the TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia
Indonesian rational Army). Any effort to understand Indonesia
al_s Lr.7.1 s of te i-lact of me
Tha ja:anese rccurati-yn 7,rcduced certain very discecnible traits
which can be found in the army officer corns during the period
analyzerl. Indonesia's unique war for ihderendence formulated
the mecr ideological foundations upon which the army was built.
An exarination of that critical period cannot be omitted.
The actual role played by the Indonesian military
during the 1950-1958 period is then examined in comparison and
contrast to precedinc; portions of this study.
The final chapter contains some conclusions which resulted
frcm the study.
CHAPTER ONE
THE ROLE OF THE AFMY IN UNL,ERDEVELCPED COUNTRIES
The army can affect the political development of a nation
in two ways. It can use force or it can effect change on the
basis of a minimum resort to fcrce and coercion. OLviouTly,
although the use of force is the simplest and most expeditious
means available, it is prcbably the least desirable since
coercive methods often result in animosity toward the army and
the central government which ordered its use, breeding discontent
and disunity.
How can the army affect the political development of a
new nation with a minimal coercive effort? First of all, it is
very important that the army be motivated by some strongly held
political conviction. In the United States the army is motivated
by certain principles of a political idealism which have been
expressed most effectively by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur
and are best exemplified in the motto of the United States Military
Academy, "Duty, Honor, Country". Throughout the modern Western
world the most effective forces in the development of our political
systems have follcwed similar ideals.
These forces have been unified. They must have represented
a viewpoint resulting from a common experience and a common
necessity. A country's form of government, the tradition of its
4
people, the original inhabitants of its land and its geographic
1L.,-tion contribute to this outlook. It mirrors the philosophy
and way of life from which it has grown.
In significant cases varying from Nigeria to the United
States armies have been protectors of constitutional orders. If
a constitutional order does not exist, it may be necessary that
the military be an executor of some political program in order
to promote stability which can then result in some form of
economic growth necessary for the further development of the
nation.
Inherently, armies have certain economic and social
functions which effect change. The limit to an army's abilities
to make change lies only in the power that it possesses and the
extent to which its officer corps wishes to use this power.
Armies make direct *and indirect contributions to the economic
development of a country) they are training grounds for
technical and administrattve skills and they develop managers for
economic enterprises to meet their own requirements and the needs
of the civilian society. Py its very nature the army accumulates
a considerable amount of material and technological resources
which are necessary for a country's development. World War TT
focused attention on expanded military operations and for the
first time military training on a mass scale was an important
source of technological assistance to underdeveloped countries.
1
Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political
Development  of New Nations (Chicago: University of Ch:cago Press,1964), pp. 75-76.
5
Eoth the Allies and t].e Axis :o-wei excns.:i a lar€-„c Tortion of the
world's manpower to technical training and organizational
disciYe. Selvice in the armed forces .7.i any country inilies
a di=c :_reates conesicr a _en, ee7r:t de c_1-
This sErvice affects not only the scidier :Jut a_,:10 his family,
therefore playing an important role in the nation-building task.
Perhaps the most important contribution that an army can
-,ake t 71-2e political develc;ment a
insisten,:e upon Et =mon language
•
.rcticr. on:
This is, of course, necessary in t. _ -.1.11tary for instruction in
7ilitary subjects and for communication between leaders and
mbordinates. It further helps tc erase any tribal and racial
differencc3 which nay exist 1-etween soldiers. In most ex-British
and ex-French territories the language of the colonial
administration has been adopted as the official language and is
common after the recruit stage. In Ghana, literacy in English
is the chief aim of early; military training. It is the language
of instruction and command. The use of native languages is
officially prohibited.
2
Nigeria's current civil war is being
successfully waged by an army which has insisted upon this
requirement. In Peru all officers are specifically prepared by
the National Military College for a continuous literacy campaign
to brin;-, the remote, inaccessible Trountain areas under central
control.
2
WIlliam Gutteridge, Military Institutions and Power in
the New States (New York: Fredce-ick A. Fraeper, ]965), pp. 47-54.
6
Air'; t ini_ted upon :his language
unifor7_ ocn its cfticers. The Indian Army has been
.clucc r.= pic3,cef in _uch a way in the arry,
1 - n sfhla withaut a cor=n
armed forces serve in an educational role and aid,
for exa-.ole, in improving adult literacy, disease prevention,
personal hygiene and infant welfare. Inherently, a well trained
fcl c oa as: 1st in develL -,ing uhlic
aftef natural disasters by building
bride:. roads and other enL-ineering -;rojects which contribute
to a country's econc7ic rehatilitatirm and growth.
There is little doubt That The military can have a very
effecti-.-.= role in the developme , of a new nation without the use
of force or coercion when organized and oriented properly.
:-.
Tndonesia is unitary state in Southeast Asia occupying
all cf Malay Archipelago west of New Guinea and south of the
east half of Timor, a 90. square
mIle 2n 7-_h n,:rthwe - Timor, and the north-
westerr. =:ection of "Ecrneo. 't is remarkable that such a diverse
spot on -_ne face of the globe an Sc cnited under one flag.
Ori,71nall7 grouped tc, ether by the T.Itch for economic
exploiticn, with no other viable common heritage, it is a
source of wonderment that this rich, resource-laden modern
political unit continues to survive amid the stronger, power-mad,
greedy nations of the world.
The more than 3,000 islands composing Indonesia stretch
1,100 miles across the equator (5°30' north to 12 south latitude)
and 2,800 miles between Asia and Australia (950 to 135° east
longitude) and separate the Indian Ocean from the Pacific Ocean.
The country has an area of 575,893 square miles, in six main
physical divisions: Sumatra; Java (including Madura);
Kalimantan (Borneo); Sulawesi (Celebes); Nusa Tenggara (the lesser
Sunda chiefly Bali, Lombok, Sumbawa, Sumba, Flores and





a ionnlation of '22,700,C00, acccrling to tho 1360
est mat- the Indonesian National Planning Council, Indonesia
oc -t:or 'ices countzy _;1•- the ‘:orli. Tne ecn•..1,itions
of - wereestinated _s follows: Java, bS -illion:
Sumatre, nillion: Sulawesi, 1 million; and Kalimantan, 4 million.
71cgically, the Indonesian archipelago has three sections:
(1) the Snr: latform, a southeastern extension of ancient
ncw
Sui7.atr7,, water tem
and the centinent: (2) the Sahul Shelf, the rorthernnost
section .77 *e ancient Australian Shield, also above sea level
in recen: ,.- eclo7,1cal times, supporting the eastern islands and
New Cuinr_ : rand (.?,) an intermediate area, including the western
island of Nusa Tenggara, Sulawesi and some of the Maluku, all
rising out of deep waters that were once part of a broad strait
separating the enlarged Asiatic and Australian continents.
Wallace'- line and Weber's line (a theoretical dividing line
serving as a boundary between the Asiatic and Australian
zoogeogra;hic regions) running between Bali and Limbok mark the
transition between Asiatic and Australian flora and fauna.
Indonesia's topography is one of marked contrasts. The
most extensive mountain system extending from Northern Sumatra
southward near its west coast curves eastward along southern
Java Tenc,-drd. The section in Sumatra known as the
Barisan ontains ri=es to 12,467 feet at :lount Kerintgi south
of Padani,. Lsr;e nanr,es sweep northwar3 across Kalimantan,
Sulawesi and !alul\il. Indonesia has mole than 100 active or
9
recently active volcanoes, most of part of the major mountain
system. Lake Toba, Indonesia's la:zest fresh water lake, occupies
a huge extinct acicanic caldera in .o hem Sumatra. Tha most
voicaaa Una; island of a_akaaau, in the Funa
Strait 'between ,matra and Java, aa:ch erupted explcsivala in
1883. Broad plains lie east of the 1?.arisan Mountains in Sumatra,
aorth of the volcanic mountains in :ava, and in several parts of
Kalimantan.
Elsaw'aara most level land fund on coastal fringes
of mountainous islands. Waters =aallow in the strait of
::alacca between Sumatra and alaya. the Karimata Strait
between Kaliman:an and Sumatra, in -*a- Java Sea on the Sunda
Platform, and on :he Sahul Shelf in eastern Indonesia; but deep
waters are characteristic of the Indian Ocean and the narrow
seas, including ::akassar Strait between Kalimantan and Sulawesi,
of the central archipelago. The longest rivers are the eastern
flowing streams cf Sumatra with headwaters near the western coast
and those of Kalimantan rising in its north-central mountains.
Located astride the equator, Indonesia has a tropical
marine climate, having at sea level uniform:, high temperatures,
high humidity and moderate to heavy rainfall. Season-ability
results from changes in wind patterns and directions. The average
monthly temperature ranges between 770 and 810 F; the average
daily temperature fluctuates between 70° and 900 F; and the
absolute range is 61° to 970 F.
Most of westarn and northern Tadonesia is characteriaed
by a tropical rain rore,;t cimate with average annual rainfall of
10
Tr.c,re tr-n 9, Inchcs. Eastward fx ccrtral Java a f,avanl--.
tropical wet and dry climate prevails, with decreed anmual
rainfall and increased variaDility as to total 11 length
of dry season. Throughout aunt of rF,infall, .:mperature,
an,: humidity vary with elevation, winds and distance from the coast.
The Asiatic or west monsoon is strongest close to the continent;
the Australian monsoon influences eastern Indonesia. The decrease
of tem7:--rat.re at inc- l-ea,,ed elevations is shown in Java, wl.ere
at _ILta (coastal) the average annual temperat-re is 7 F; at
Bogor (800 feet), 75° F; at Bandund (2,300 feet). 710 F; and at
Tcsari, (5,ECC feet), 61° F. Highlands near popul:us lowlands
provide temperature relief, with cooling air drainage, and have
accessible places to visit; they are densely populated in parts
of Java and Sumatra.
Physical diversities such as these have provided ideal
environments for the development of divergent cultural groups.
Access or lack of access to neighboring islands directly affected
the social and cultural characteristics of Indonesia's various
tribal groupings. If the reader simply considers the various
CaribLean Islands more familiar to him, he can readily think of
specific examples of widely varying races, religions and
governments which have sprung up in this archipelago.
7:7
ladonesia's :nique awareness of its own cultural diversity
is ;rofound and universal as a result of the living of its many
in eth:-,10 di-:ersitv over a 7eriod of thoasands of years.
bun.::,sed different etic grc:s s72eaking two hundred distinct
languages inhabit this vast island complex. The age-old
Inicnecdan saying "Other fields, o-rhr locusts, other pools, other
fish" highlights the awareness of its different customs present
in this society.
The Indonesian social framework has two structural
features. It is very diverse in values, outlooks, and capacities
on the cultural level, and its social forms are various, open and
aCaptal;le. The normal biOlogical process of speciation has
cc7.hined with the position of Indonesia as a crossroads or
confluence of many ways to form varying cultures such as the
Javanese and the Pasisir, both of which arr2 amalgams of elements
from many sources. The majority of Indonesian peoples have
responded to a continuous historical onslaught cf influences from
alien cultures with receptivity, flexibility, and selectivity.1
Hildred Geertz, "Indonesian Cultures and Communities,"




Most of the world's !-eligi:ns are represented here. Islam
represents the beliefs of 95 per cent of the people. Five per cent
:av I ceiall so±le Independent
-ntsian langua.;es which hal_
many close conale , L the nighly imiiar grarmatical
structure. (See A7pen,lix II.)
This collect.:-. of innumerable mountainous islands ringed
by the aal_ :Lva Sea a groot of people in coastal
areas who have mach::c -or, an a zecond group of inland
peoples who ar, characterictical:7, nighlv divergent.
Three broad ty;as of societies exist in these islands.
A strongly Hinduize-1 irland group :.ccupies the wet-rice growing
areas. A trade-oriented, deeply Islamic group lives on the coasts.
Lastly, the interior mountainous regional people are mainly
pagan tribal groups. These sociocultural tyres are very
indistinct conceptual divisions into which the many groups of
these island people can 1;c! imperfectly fitted.
One-half of the total population of Indonesia makes up
the wet-rice growing group which occupies Central Java and South
Bali. The culture of this area is strongly derived from India
of the first Millennium. The people are very formal in etiquette,
insist upon proper recognition of status, and admire spiritual
and social refinemen-f to a very great degree. The arts, such as
danre mw;ic, .!ran-a, f-nd literaure, are intensively cultivated.
The people of Bali are more traditicn-ori_mted than the Javanese,
who lack diLztinct scc'al hounaaries, because of Java's strong
backgrs -snd of Islam an: colonial :smereial development. Java has
an absence of institutionalized internal groupings and is almost
urban centers.
s-Z iaru
i7.1, ,es in these E.as are
becoming almcst unmanagea:ole.
The Islamic coastal peoples, like the Malays of Sumatra
and Borneo and the !a'-cassarese of the South Celebes:, are widely
scatteres. They do, 1.owever, have a common history, particularly
frcm the 24th to the - ;-th centuries when they were involved in
the inte:national spice trade. These peol_les a/e characterized
by ethnic hetercgeneitv. They are commercially oriented although
they ha/e high resTect for Islamic religious learning and law.
The most important unifying element is respect for certain types
cf music, dances and literature. Zany twentieth century towns
have sprung up around former trading kingdoms in this area.
such as
Pagan tribal groups encompass a wide range of cultures
the Toradja of the Celebes, the Kayak of interior Borneo,
the people of Halmahera, of interior Ceram, the lesser Sundra
islands and the Lampong of Sumatra. These people were isolated
until the 20th century. For thousands of years they regularly
engaged :n tribal wars and head-hunting. They are untouched by
Islam or Hinduism, and only recently have Christian missionaries
been active in these areas. Shifting cultivation of dry rice or
g.ardeninz of sago, or rcot crops are the agricultural
practices of these sccietieF. Kinship ties are more important than
territorial ties in this scmi-noradic existence.
14
uch of Indonesia retains tr.Rditionl form of society.
The Western form of education, however, is very pervasive and
able to all
The
ways as a result.
Indonesia, the world's fifth nost opulous nation, with
the expanse of its islands sr,readinz over 3,000 miles, is one
f the
It is presently under=cs:r.:7 a
and cultural change.
2 .
Ibid., pp. 24, 32.
COLONIAL INHE-ITACE
Any effort to understand Indonesia must include an analysis
,.:13-7 the impact of the ::etherlands in this "East Indies" area. The
natLcns t. e .avo ' en facing
siroe 1.:ta-e 7an1:7,-12. 7E" ic:ea cf
confronted indo:lesiu in 1945 at the 1.th of Its indezendence cne
me7 muse upon the words of Moc.Karto ::ctc-,:idadc, a former
Ambassador of Indonesia to the United States, when he once asked
an !-.merican audience to "conjure up a vision of the Green Y.cuntain
Boys of New Hampshire in 1776 contemplating the problems of the
20th century's industrialization." During the past twenty-three
years Indonesia has been asked to "adjust to the 20th century
almost overnight."
Certainly, any attempt to study the Green Mountain Boys
would consider the British contribution as colonizers and
nation-builders.
In Indonesia, the Dutch played a major role, having arrived
there in 1593 to find a virtual cornucopia of natural resources.
1
The Dutch went to the Indies for the sole purpose of buying spices.
2
1
Mockarto Notowidigdo, "An ihdonesian Policy Aired at Main-
taininz Freedom and Promoting World Peace," The Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 318 (July, 1958), 45.
2(leorge asselman, TLe Cradle of Colonillism (New Haven:
Yale Thiverrity Press, 1963), p. 454.
1_5
he Is_amIc kirnTdcm was breakl. Ihe local
sltua7:= chara:t,rizeci by war, bloodshed, cruelty, and
Lwe,:ry-fivo year war
et- €- enth century, most of the 1. 1 1ds of the
archipelago had been militarily subjugated by the Dutch.
4
The
Dutch were very cnly cclonialistic and exploitive.
5
 In 1,201
a2:cc_.-,e, an "ethical" crse :
her In1s. ;Me -.e-hods '.;FO'4- by her sul'ects tc 7fe:'Efe fcr and
pursue her :olicy, The results achieved under it, and the
evelo-- ent and results of successor policies deserve detailed
The ::in2dcm of 11.e Netherland:, in 1948 consisted of
Holland, the American West Indies, and the Asian East Indies. The
East Indies was a political entity created by the forceful efforts
of the Dutch, who have been described as being a sturdy, imaginative,
intelligent, resourceful, courageous, determined, religiously
inclined, and comparatively liberal people.
6
-Stanley K. Hornbeck, "The United States and theNetherlands East Indies," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 255 (1948), 124.
4_
,oC:arto Notowidigdo, "The Confrontation of influencesIn Indonesia," The Annuals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 244 (1959), 68.
5 
Herman J. Friedericy, "Indonesian Problems," The Annalsof :he American Academy  of Political and Social Science, 224 (1(450),134.
Stanley K. Hornbeck, op. cit.
Ft;
•.:tch very axclus -Jrccess to
choose its civil sc-rvan'.s to re.creLant it In the East Indies. All
eehdiJaI, . i7cv=e.et •: Pl'a0
- Is. ---:-.c1.1:,tes
academic :, and . qualities of character. Cr.co chosen,
these individuals receieed a government grant while attending a
r:ve year course of seeJe: at either the University of Leiden or
the W1-3 .:Shec: 13 enter the al
service fell:ei a c - c :o :ears follree_d
ty three years cf lee, e=t:-e , anthro:::c1...7y, tropical
economy d ecreerse've col -nia: ti,--eor7. The :utch have always
believed that learn from cther people's errcrs by
studying, ih detail, the frec,uent similarities between the problems
of adjacent cclonial powers.
Candidates for the administrative services studied law for
two years, then worked for three years on specialized colonial
studies. After their unikiersity examinations, candidates served
one to two years in the colonies as probatieners before their
civil service appointments were confirmed.
The Dutch probationer was a very highly trained specialist
who was probably more qualified for his work than even his British
counterpart. Unlike the British, however, the Dutch served only
in the East Thdies, a relatively homogeneous area compared to
British trocical derendennies.
The sy:_le of the Dutch greatly resembled the British
because the 2ritis'e selected their members by appointment rather
a
xaointion. The ordinary school curriculum and the
tec1 ofaining peoiod following appointment also were like
o
trainef lalists than the British.
Thc17utch ?roLa:lon :sericd,
helped to 77,71e their men more hizhly
7
Since the East Indies was the most important colony of
the N t'orians, the Dutch directed almost all of their efforts
tcoart its Oeoelopment. This area had tremendous difficulties
rooted in t'ne social and economic condition of the local
popoaation. There seems to little doubt that rrior to 1900
the :7enly colonialist and exploitative. However, the
local o:oolation exoerienced phenomenal growth under the Dutch,
to theex,nt that the population expanded eightfold during the
period to 1950. Java, for example, had a population of
four and one-half million in 1815 that rose to twenty million in
1880. It doubled again by 1930, and twenty years later fifty-one
million :,ecole inhabited this main island, which has become one
of the most densely populated areas in the world.
8
A Dutch
official estimated that the food needed to support the steadily
mounting oopulation "was increasing by 4.2 kilograms per second"
when the limits of agricultural production by either
intensification or extensification were reached in 1940.
9
'Lennox A. Mills, "Methods of Appointment and Training in
the rrch co- d Dutch Colonial Civil Service," The American
Political Scitnce Review, XXXIII (1936), 468-470.
neman J. Frie -2ericy, co. cit., 2 n. 135.
9
Amry Vandenhosoh, "The Flaming East," The Annals of  the
Ar..p -oicanof Political and Social Science, 257 (l948), 86.
19
"rf 2u.ch nt proa,:ly to their long range Drogram
initiated in 1301, 'ilhemina's "ethical" course, which was designed
to :-7 flf living le7'oneelan = or. ral<e
him litefa7, -nd tc: him the first nrinciples
Indonesian nationalists, on the other hand, argue that the Dutch,
becomin: absorbed in 7aterial progress, displaced their nation's
basic value syste7, ..tr.1,ssed cooperation, to2cran,r, and
avoidance c.f strife) ',nTLettied villaee tradition, did not-Ling
to "modernize" the nati7es.
the colonials first arrived on the ,,cene see!<ing to
buy spices a policy of "free enter,erise" prevailed. However, it
was a virtual seller's monopoly and, as a result, the native rulers
quadrupled their prices to colonial buyers within a few years.
Most natives regarded it as virtuous to deceive the unbelievers
and they knew all the tricks. They sold spices of inferior
quality, loaded some with water, traded short weights with others,
and some rulers would even sell the same spices twice and require
payment in advance. Since the Dutch had no court of their own
they truly had no redress. However, they were willing to submit
their cases to the local authorities for satisfaction due. The
Euroneans received no redress and were disillusioned by local
Moslem tradition.
By 1629 the English were competing in the local spice
trade. Although the Dutch had contracts with the natives, tile
islanders preferred to go to nearby English ports where they were
paid twice the Dutch contract price for srices. As a result, the
2C
natives fell behied oe eheii agree-eente in the sum of cne-half
million guilders in 1650. The United East India Company was
their ewn contraets we_e hrc;een, it seems to have been
inevitable that this authority led to a rationale justifying
territorial conquest.
10
By 1680 the retch had seieed all means cf handlinr, export
crops for the islan;:s and were fercinz the people to plant crops
calculated tc bin: :eirhes: e-.aree price.
11
This was the first real and deleterious effect that
colonization had on the Indies. ee the Dutch increased their
control under the East India Company hy setting up a strong central
Dutch government, ending internal wars, epidemics, severe
repression by native princes, and general insecurity, the native
population began to increase significantly. Almost immediately,
the East India Company attempted to cope with this increase.
Under its direction extensive forest clearing, cultivation of
virgin lands, and intensification of land use was implemented,
but to no avail. Frantically, Indonesian-built irrigation systems
were improved; new ones were built; Letter methods of cultivation
and new selected seeds to improve crop yields were developed.
12
The Dutch became further absorbed in material progress,
as a result of this attempt to respcnd to the population increase,
10(leorge 71aeelmen, cit., pp. 454-455.
11
Flora Bridges, "The Netherlands Pecerd in Indonesia,"Current History, 13 (October, 1947), 217.
12








and little was done to: help the indi7idual islander to break
out of his tredi-,:ional setting.
a : me fo,- the Dutch ejoneers.
13
Thee
eentifie with and the people, and reecenie.ed that
they had a nation-building mission to complete as well as a
livelihood to gain)
4
In 1901, as briefly mentioned earlier, Queen Wilhelmina
greatly accelerated a rather enlig'tened Dutch liberal co1onia2
tolicy —:en she publicly advocated the "ethical" policy which
resulted from the publicatim of a hook entitled Nax Havelaar
by an unl-ncwn author who had lived In the colonies. Recognizing
the conditions needed for Western-style capitalism to flourish
in the iniee, the book clarified the colony's need for modern
sanitation, education, and legal and political systems. The
government of the Netherlands agreed that these items were needed
for future profitable operations to continue in the Indies.
15
The Dutch believelb in protecting and preserving native
customs and traditions by the use of indirect rule. The
Netherlands Indies were part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.
The Queen and the Netherlands States-General were the highest
legal political authority. In actuality this authority was
exercised only for laws of constitutional importance and on main
--Datas C. Smith, Jr., The Land and Reoele of Indonesia
(Philadel hia: J. B. Lippincott Company, r. O.
14_
Stanley K. Hornbeck, op. cit., p. 126.
15
Flora bridges, ob. cit.. p. 218.
22
princiles of e,- or.. The basis for all Indies Government
can he found in the 7onstit'itional Act and the Netherlands Indies
7:veree:ent e n : t'nehcne cepverreent was
exerci:ef. ty tne -.e-er of the o:eicnies.
The head :- the colonial government was the Governor-
General, who was a::ointed by the Crown, and a council consisting
cf the _overnor-3e:.eral as president, a vice-president and four
other -e-Ler by the Ci -m. -Jrecil 1928 all members were
Hollanders. teat time two natives were added. The council had
to be consulted on certain specific mattere, although it was only
an advisory body. 1: 1918 a People's Council or Volksraad was
organized. Its assent was necessary for all legislative
ordinances. Twenty-five Hollanders, thirty natives and five
foreign orientals -ade up its memtership. Sixty per cent of
the Volksraad's members were elected. The remainder was
appointed by the Governor-General after consultation with the
council of the Nethe-lancis Indies. It had to be consulted by
the Covernor-Gencral on all legislation.
16
It could amend all
bills, pass on then, petition the Crown and the States-General,
and it elected a conmittee of twenty delegates. This committee
had the power to act on proposed ordinances when the Volksraad
17
was not in session.'
16John A. Yrlee, "The Dutch East Indies," The American 
Political Science  26 (1932), 712.
17Amry Vandenbosch, "Southeast Asia and the Philippines,"The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science, 226 (arch, 1943), 91.
23
At the local 1.z%el some ar,ir, w,-re under dirc,ct Dutch
control; others had naive rllers. For example, in Januar', 1932,
-:cven per -.=nt of the under naive rule 'ava.
-
were under native control. For 70St part, at the local level
Dutch advisors had a great deal of influence.
Under the direct administration concept a considerable
number of small provinces were u-.der the direction of a governor,
or an officer called a reside-A- Of assistant residents. The
a.7:-Inistratcrs had been trained at schools for civil servants at
Batavia, one cf the six largest cities in Java. These officials
were Hollanders ,rained at the Universities of Leiden or
Utrecht. In the outer Islands further subdivision was made under
administrators. Native officials were known in Java as Buptai.-
Starting in 1918 there had been a devolution of responsibility
to these native officials.
18
The Dutch appointed to higher positions a small minority
of Javanese and a somewhat larger group of Eurasians who had
been education in Holland. The greatest majority of policy-
making positions continued to be held by Turopeans.
19
The Dutch in the Indies were always close to the mother
country and, partly as a'result, encouraged the develcprent of
70large scale Western economic enternrises. Most important, they
18John A. Fairlee, op. cit., p. 713.
Lennox A. Mills, op. cit., p. 466.
20Stanley K. Hornbeck, op. cit., p. 125.
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had a heneficent policy of prohibitini7 the alienation of land
to non-indigenous persons.21 They allowed long-term rental or
leases, but even ind could not buy land. This
ca-sed so 7-I.:oh hitt,,IL(ss that :olicy was r-ciified in the
1920's so that Eurasians could accuire very limited areas without
endangering the land rights of natives.
The develcpment of plantations as an integral part of
the Dutch land policy was helpful for the economy, but it did
not ail the integration of the fifty-odd ethnic groups in this
ccuntry. The rutch continued to be absorbed in materal progress.
By 1932 public administration was highly developed and
well organized. Seven national departments existed; they were
justice, civil service, finance, education and worship,
agriculture, industry and commerce, public works and governmental
industries.
The administration of justice was combination of
European and native systAs. The Europeans had a civil, commercial,
and penal code which was approximately the same as that of the
Netherlands. The penal code applied also to the natives and to
foreign orientals. In civil cases the Chinese followed ruropean
law; however, other orientals were guided by customary family law
except in the case of property matters, when European law was
followed. Native courts were used for matrimonial and inheritance
22 .cases where Islamic law was applicable. Additionally, the
21Amry Vandenbosch, "Southeast Asia and the Philippines,"
E. cit., 93.
22
John A. Fairlee, 2: cit., p. 714.
Volksraad served as a sounding hoard for discontented people, even
though many densely Icpulated areas were greatly underrepresented
en it.
_erin e early l00's the Dutch were preoccupied with
the population 7::rchlem. The pressure continued to mount; after
World War I the population increased fifty per cent.24 In 1930
large numbers cf Javanese peasants were forced to emigrate to
less densely Itcculeted areas in another effort to alleviate the
pressure.
The 2'...tch -,cre never able to ameliorate this problem
and because of their preoccupation with it, and with material
progress, education suffered. The Dutch even failed to develop
an understanding by a majority of the people of Dutch culture
and philosophy. 0nly a very few natives received a Western
education. By 1870 European schools were available. Natives
were allowed to attend in limited numbers. Vocational education
schools were active in 1421. The first college was opened in
1920.
The Dutch took little interest in education of the
Indonesians because they felt it would violate their general
principle of indirect rule. By acting as they did they failed
to promote either social unity or economic integration, both of
which could have resulted from a more positive educational
approach. Elementary education was furnished both in Dutch and
"Fiera Bridges, op. cit., p. 220.
24lierm,L J. Triedericy, DE. cit., pp. 135-137.
in the verncular. It did not extend to all children as they
did not speak Dutch. Most students needed to speak Dutch to
tt a eeccndary or a 7echni,: '3chool, therefore, t'r•, rjCrJty-
of the poptflat3on :as excluded. Lccal villa7,es provided * 1--.eir
own early education.
As an exception, the Dutch system of education on Java
from a practical vocational standpoint did have considerable
success. It was based on a study of India and the Phil ines
as examples of too much literacy and too little technical education
combined with over-emphasis on Western culture to the detriment
or the hest elements of the indigenous native civiliz,ation.25
Nationalists attacked the entire Dutch school system
illogically. Native schools that existed were branded "too
Western". The Dutch were charged with depriving natives of
educations if schools were curtailed. The cost per pupil was
definitely too high. Western schools educated 146,215 students
for the same price it todk to educate 1,513,088 students in
equivalent native schools.26
In brief summary, very little was done by the Dutch,
educationally, for the people of the Indies." Their policy of
protecting native customs by indirect rule slowed down the
cultural unification of scores of ethnic groups by providing them
25Lennox A. Mills, op. cit., p. 468.
26
F lord Bridges, op. cit., p. 214.




seaia.cilools for each cthif.c. group.
28
As a result,  only six
per cen: of the popula*.on could take advantage of advanced or
-.y . R=1.1;.inr. and culture were unaffected by
,:21j a Icw came in contact with Western c.J1ture.
Only a handful were made aware of the political and philosophical
practices of the west.
Rapid industrialization was started by the Dutch in 1935.
Old i: ..';ences industries such is spinning and weaving were given
new 1.1:-e and importance. Textiles were the most important new
industry introduced by the Dutch using Western capital. The
economic life of this area was affected by the Dutch Indirect
rule concept by introducing some large scale industry for the
first tire. World War II interrupted this Dutch effort in its
infancy.
Ey 1941 the Indies had become of political, economic,
and strategic importance to the whole world. When other European
populations withdrew in a mass exodus from other parts of
Southeast Asia as the Japanese invasion became imminent, the
Dutch remained; their wives and children shared with the natives
the hardships inflicted by the Japanese. The Dutch had the
support of a maority of the population, but unarmed and untrained
civilians could do little against a heavily armed, ruthless invader.
Before the attack the Japanese made vigorous =.ffortS to
win over the native leaders. With few exceptions all overtures
23Richard A. Butwell, and Amry Vandenbosch, The Changing
Face of Southeast Asia (Lexington, Kentucky: University of
Kentucky Press, 1)b7), p. 28.
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were rejecl.e, at the lenalists made it clear
to the Dutch that the bill for this loyalty would he presented
pay7-.--,:nt after fouo:nt h/avely witn the
Lj inst the Japantse. :he government instructed
civilians not to resist the enemy troops, but to take action
against ununiformed marauders and parachutists. The Dutch
organized 37,000 volunteers in Ail Raid Precaution Services and
another 50,000 in Destruction Squads. About ic,roc guerrillas
were very active during the resistance, desertions were non-
existent, and even when local police offica'.s were arrested
are± shot, the majority of the nationals refused tc collaborate
with the Japanese.
Progress toward self-government was very slow under the
Dutch a:.d no real unified national feeling existed. However, the
support that the government received while the threat of war
was hanging over the people, and during the invasion, is the very
best indicator of their opinion of Dutch rule as compared to
Japanese rule.
29
The main reason for this support lies in the solid base
of a wide holding of land which resulted from the Dutch prohibition
of the alienation of land to non-indigenous persons.
30 
No other
single measure could have had this effect on the natives.
29Lennox A. Mills, "Some Problems of Post War Reconstruction,"
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,
226 (March, 1943), 135-140.
30Datus C. :pith, Jr., OD. cit., p. 48.
ed in ranv areas. Their personal attitudes
in co:.tacts and relationships with the natives aroused suspicion,
L.en lit,er anti:athy. Their ,:ternness and•
not spawn lit.zetion and devotion cn the part of
their oriental subjects.31 The Dutch underrated the native
capacity to assume the responsibility of self-government
primarily because they did not truly know the people. The
colonial, were able, well trained administrators thoroughly
in scal law, language, and economics. They respected
native institutions to an unusual degree resulting in their
failure co assimilate any large number of natives into the Dutch
culture.32
This policy cf separation left the people unprepared for
independence and for conducting their own affairs. They were
not trained through education or by going through gradual steps
to self-government. The Dutch never saw, until it was too late,
the great change in local Indies thought.33 Unlike Britain in
India or the United States in the Philippines, the Dutch were
never able to feel that the freedom movement in the Indies was
ever rea1.34
9riefly, the Dutch recognized the Javanese population
problem. All measures to improve the situation did not bring
31Stanley Y. Hornbeck, op. Lit., p. 126.
32Flora F1-1. ges, op. cit., p. 220.
33Datus C. Smith, Jr., cyr, . cit., p. 41.
34 •nrd., p.2.
29
_e., alt :;h. hunreds of thcli-,71s ef natives had found new
existences in Sumatra, Borneo, and the Celebes as part of one of
no manufacturi:i.-
facilities had an unfortunate lack of trained political,
engineering, educational, medical, and administrative personne1.35
The Indies had many grave unsolved social and economic problems,
:stly:,:i,;ineting in Java's over7ct'elation. The balance between
population and the means of sum:cr.: -:ar unstable even though the
Indies reached self-sufficiency in fcodstuffs in 1938. Though
the stan .fard of living was low, it was still higher than other
countries in the area except for the Philippines. There were nc
epidemics or famines. Total exports were in the billions of
dollars. Sixty per cent of these exports were produced by
individual local growers. Industrialization was underway.
Results were seen in many areas when World War II came.
36
The Dutch conquest never was ccmpleted. It gave a
scattered group of islands political integration, established law
and order, and internal peace. The area was developed economically,
though local laws and customs were left in place, and the old 1)ases
of economic life and welfare were strengthened. The physical
success of this fantastic effort is mirrored in the amazing increase
in Java's population. Western-managed plantations and industries
gave Western knowledge and methods to all involved in the process.
35Xockarto rotowidigao, "An Indonesian Policy Aimed atMa:ntaining rreedom and Promoting World Peace," (la. cit., 43.
36Herman •J. rriedericy, op. cit., p. 138.
rest importa%tly, the Dutch 7.,ssed the 18E7-1870
legislation which was the keystone of their strength and colonial
rom
villaze t'ar:-: lands. The transportatlon services 1€-velope:1 by
the Dutch made possible a very profitable interisland and overseas
trade. Scientific training was provided in Holland and in the
Indies for civil servants on the islands.
The Netherlands sent into service large numbers of their
very best men and women, many of whom established themselves and
their families permanently in the Inr'ies.37
Many Dutch lives, skills, efforts and funds were invested
In these enterprises. The rutch and the East Indies profited.
37Stanley K. Hornbef7k, op. cit., T. 125.
CHAPTER FIVE
JAPANESE LEGACY
Before the Japanese invaded the East Indies there was very
little opportunity for natives to undertake military careers under
the Dut. Some soldiers from Christian areas did serve in the
Royal Netherlands Indies Army (KNIL). There were very few native
officers, however. A few notable exceptions did exist, including
Indonesian Generals Nasution, Simatupang, and Suryadarma, who
served as junior officers.
The Japanese invasion of January 10, 1942, was important
from an Indonesian Army standpoint because the Japanese immediately
organized the natives into military groups and provided military
training. This period is significant because the greatest number
of senior officers in the army from 1950-19E38 first received
training under the Japanese, while the Japanese occupied in the
Indies.
1
The combined Dutch and Indonesian defense of the
archipelago failed miserably.2
Ey !arch 7, 1942, a central Japanese Military
administrazicn was set up Leaded by a Cunseikan or Chief Military
-bruce Grant, Irh:onesia, (London: Melbourne University
Press, 1964), D. 69.
0
'N. A. Aziz, Ja an's Colonialism and Indonesia, (The Hague:
Martinas Nijhcff, 195), p. 147.
32
33
Al:Jinistrator who governed nine separate departnts. As of
August 5, 1942, a rigidly centralized bureaucratic system similar
le Japan' e own 'lac: been organized on Java with Leadquareers at
Eatavia. This was the headquarters of the Sixteenth Imperial
Japanese Army. It consisted of two provinces of seventeen
residences each. Sumatra was placed under the Japanese military
administration of Malaya controlled by the Seventh Imperial
:apanese Army. Dutch Borneo, the Celebes, and the lesser Scenda
Islands were sepere.ised by the Japanese Naval Administration of
Macassar.
3
All native officials were required to swear allegiance
to the Japanese Army.4
The Japanese organized several militarily oriented groups,
the most important of which was the Peta. Its members were
selected from local influential persons who had strongly developed
senses of racial consciousness. The Peta was not a part of the
Japanese army. Peta officers were trained for three months at
guerrilla camps and then; were returned to their villages to
prepare defenses against expected allied attacks, after having
taken an oath of allegiance to the Sixteenth Imperial Japanese
Army. Noncommissioned officers were also given three months of
training. The training emphasized infantry tactics in guerrilla
warfare against motorized troops. Racial sentiments and devotion
to cause were constantly stimulated. Emphasis was placrd on
the Nipponese "elan" concept. To "fight or die" and "tr 7:resent
3
F. C. Jones, The Far East, 1942-]946 (London: The Oxford
University Press, l951, pp. 74-75.
4 .
Azaz, op. cit., 150.
yourself with your soul, flesh and bloc] for the Javanese Lcmeland
and the great East Asia idea" was of great importance.
5
:n the Peta, oorTany c,Ificers, were
field ,:r.ao'e officers an above were all Japanese.
6
There were a number of other Japanese-sponsored
organizations. The Hei Ho (second class reserve soldier), a work
corps, was part of the Japanese forces. The Hei Ho were
auxiliary troops in the navy and were considered equal with
Japanese forces. They were paid and served in the anti-air corps,
and with tanks, artillery and mortars.
The Keiboodan was a civilian organization whose main -'_uty
was to render first aid ih case of fire or air raids. Its merers
were an auxiliary police force. The Nami Kikan was a sea-
reconnoitering force used to observe enemy activity along the
coast. The Beppan or Nansectai furnished information to the
military on anything of importance such as rumors, rebellions,
and all signs of unrest. This was an observation apparatus to
prevent mistakes by the military government in governing the
popul•ace.
Differing strengths are available on some groups. The
hest figures fcund follow: Peta, 37,000; Hei Ho, 25,000;
Keiboodan, 50,000; youth groups, 500,000 to 600,000; student
5 •Ibid. pp. 227-229.r.
6
Spencer Paul Miller, Indonesian Military Policy nr;
Envisioned by Two Chiefs of Staff (?,erkeley, California: Univer=ity
of California, 16 May 1958), p. 12.
7Aziz, on. cit.. p. 229.
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service cos, - corps, 50,000; shock troops, P0,000.
All of these grc,.:ps were oi- !.i;inally organized under Sixteenth
8pf-ri 1
nad been tr.17,1';.
-:-if 1uion officers :en
9
:aTanese under their program. When the
Japanese realized that they were losing the war they stepped up
their organiza:icnal activities, particularly with the Feta and
the Hei ho, i7:e as resistance as possible to any allied
takeolder. .=.1ry had orgarized aT::roximately
the same number on :..--a.tra and In :!alaya. There was very little
liaison -,:hese 7.: ar-,Ies ad their indigenous trcols. As
a consequence :be trainees developed entirely differently
with varyinF ani :cya:ties. During the revolution and
until 1958 these gro_ps were constantly in opposition. Upon
independence Indonesian army units raised in Sumatra were
officered by Sevent.:. Army Peta veterans and those raised in Java
were officered by Sixteenth Army Feta veterans.
10
Two separate
armies thus were created and two separate revolutions were fought.
Throughout the 1950-1958 period these groups were rivals.
Employ7.ent by he Japanese gave the Indonesians self-
confidence and some :raining for the anticipated time when the






op. cit., p. 45.
10 .
7p. 7.6-2n.
liF. C. jC7 op. cit., p. 374.
5.*
seventy Indonesians as battalion commanders, 200 as company commanders,
620 as platoon com7:anders, and 2,300 as section commanders.
12
However,
the .7a7ne=e '=;le no2!.tcallv sophisticated offic,?rs.
Thes-_ :ers srate ic thining. They felie,1
en the Japanese '..1;:hting spirit, se-mai:et, which was taught to be
more Important than technical training.13
On August 14, 1945, the Feta and the Hei Ho were officially
-otc:er. e Japanese in 7ndorr,sia, knowing
they h3d lost the war, revolted against the Allies' decisions w;th
respect to Indonesia. The natives were allowed to assume control
-of , the country. According to the orricial Indonesian Army history,
the people automatically established independent military units
throughout the islanas. The Indonesian Army was born.
At this early date a quarrel began which remained
unresolved throughout the 1950-1958 period. The questions concerned
whether Japanese-trained or Dutch-trained officers should control
the military, and whether guerrilla tactics should prevail over more
1
conventional military doctrine. The Japanese concept of spirited
%,arfare emerge4 the victor.15
"Guy J. Pauker, The Role of the Military in Indonesia
(Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, 19f0), p. 70.
p. 21.
14
 Department of the Army, Republic of Indonesia, Indonesian
Army Headquarters Military History, The History of the Armed Forces
of the Republic of Indonesia (Republic of Indonesia Special
Issu- 59), p. R.
15Spencer Paul Miller, on. cit., p. I.
ICF :I2E71=ENCE
The war for independence against the Dutch during the
period 1945 to 1949 created the Indonesian Army's tactical and
stratee,ic outlook. Ter.eLal Abdui Hans Nasution, the Indonesian
Eefcnse Xinister W.lose theories on guerrilla warfare and defense
formed the basis of Indonesian military policy from 1945 to 1958,
has given eloquent articulation to this outlook. ':uch of his
theorizing is based upon his personal experience in the war for
independence a7ainst the iAltch from 1945 to 1949. According to
Nasution, this conflict was inevitable because of three factors:i
1. The Japanese promised self-government to the
Indonesian people in order to secure their cooperation.
2. The Japanese formed and trained a home guard, the
Peta, which became the nucleus of the TNI when independence came.
3. The Japanese appointed Indonesians to positions of
high civil service responsibility, giving these officials an
opportunity to acquire administrative experience.
Nasution believes that these factors provided Indonesians
with the will toward independence, the military means to achieve it,
and the administrative ability to sustain independence.
2
'Abdul Hans Nasution, Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare




aIrived in Java in September, 1945, they
rou rutch contingents with them. Immediately, these European
It.ance ro7.
cf
Nasution was educated at the Royal Military Academy in
Pandung and was commissioned in the Netherlands Indies Army in
1943. :urinc- the war he worked in the civil administration and
Li ' .ores in EandLn:. he
DivisiJ,n,a ri1:ci10!1,11 Army EilSiot. fc)ired frc.)!-
irregular troops, from 1946 to 1948. In 1948 he conducted a
formal study of the first colonial Dutch attack.
Nasution's study of the first Dutch attack led to his
special conceot of the Indonesian defense system and military
organization.
3
Nasution points out that the Indonesian guerrillas
did not defeat the Dutch, but rather they brought the war to a
deadlock using non-cooperation and a scorched-earth policy.'
International political pressure brought the war to an end.
General Nasution does not merely reproduce :-:so-Tse-Tung's
theory; his thesis is the result of much independent thought. He
is one of the few guerrilla leaders ,:ho also has had practical
exnerience in counterinsurgency operations.
5
He points out the complexity of the ideological guerrilla







tctal recle's Difficult is encountered combating this form
cf conflict der7.aLd more than simple military solutions. To win,
:sych ical servic. Th..? inslonesian Ar17,7, Nasation arues,
is a product of an intense ideological fight and was engaged in
an anti-guerrilla war during 1950-1958. As a result, the TNI
has served as an ideological pioneer.
1-ilecae cf this ideoloEical effort, he sti-chsly emphasizes
that his !:,cs-lrn is tile vanguard of an ideology,
fl7hting for a aim. It is not merely a political "tool"
to be used with no voice in political decisions. An army which
iF merely a country's tool to be given instructions, he states,
ces not have the inner strength to withstand a violent guerrilla
war such as that which was the chief threat to the security of
his nation during 1950-1958.
7
Reminding us of the character of Indon2sia's war for
independence, Nasution sees the TNI as having a ver: special
function and position resulting from the army's special guerrilla
background within the country in relation to the people of
Indonesia. It continues to be not only militarily oriented, but
also politically, psychologically, and socio-economically oriented
as a result of this new total people's war.
Insisting that war now encompasses all of a people's





trchipelago, with an area equivalent to Europe's, unable to field
a military force comparable to the USA or the USSR, but which is
faced wit Ircblems and threats, an. h c,:hclues th:ct his
.• nust 4-- rely on its guerrilla cc:,..;ei:.ts as the
c3rner!7-cone of its modern defense plan. Nasution feels that a
badly needed modern air force and navy will not be available for
thirty years because of his country's backward ind,ostrial status.
Thercfc.: , he concludes -:hat if I:.donesia is , ver invaCed it
must re2.y on gue:-rille resistunce t-o force thc invader into a
deadloc;< until international political pressure can again win
Nasuticm's war for him.
According to its first Defense Minister, Indonesia's
revolution is not over, and therefore, its army, acting as the
vanguard of a political ideology, will continue to be politically
oriented.
8
Nasution has a sound theory which could work if a
political ideology has been formulated in Indonesia which could
guide its enlightened army. Persons familiar with this country's
political background tend to feel that many officers are still
motivated by interest in personal gain and that these officers
conduct themselves as their ancestor war lords did. The army
generally tends to support the national Pantja Sila ideology,





Interview with Ambassador Howard P. Jones, U. S.
Ambassador to Indonesia, l058-1965, July 17, 1968.
.T.CLE OF ME iNOESI AY OFFICER CORPS
1950-1958
Did the Indonesian Army 71av an effective role in the
dev: ..?nt uf it oun fr:m 11:.50 to 1958? it is true :-Jett
the military nas ten a colitical factor in Indonesia since 1949.
1
It was politically important due to its failure to produce strong
political leadership.
2
Against this background, it is relevant to consider the
origins of the Republic of Indonesia's army officer corps.
Although Indonesia has an air force and a navy, the army was by
far the most powerful of the services. "Unity in diversity"
3 
is
the Indonesian motto. "Diverse" is a good adjective to use in
describing the origins of the army officer corps. A small number
of officers were educated by the Dutch prior to 1942. The greatest
proportion of officers were drilled by the Japanese from 1943 to
1945, and a third group W3S militarily oriented during the struggle
for independence from 1945 to 1949.
4
The United States had
1
Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy inIndonesia (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 200.
2
?race Grant, 22: cit., o. 1)9.
3_.
michard Eutwell, op. cit., p. 25.
4
Guy J. Pauker, "The Role of the Nilitary in Indcnesia," TheRole of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, ed John J. Tchn:zon(Fr'Lhceton, Aew Jersey: Prince -Lon University Press, 1962), p. 187.
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treine.i - 00 as of 13. Basically, the Dutch trained administrators
"--- men were the army administrators during the period 1950-
_ an officer tx...c:ed
- 114nI tà s This thought
7.ar.fed itself from 1950-1956 in the form of the army's anti-
political ideology.
5 T
he revolutionaries in the army helped
co7.tril-ei-,e to The feeling among man: village dwellers that the
r L1 -7 0. ThIs t'romote
-.alicnellE:m and to erocie tribal ans acial feeiine.
:-]ecause of these very different oric,ins the officer
colps ee:. deeply divided. Personal 'ealcusies, conflictin7,
outlooks, and special interests contributed to this division.
Addl'ic-ally, this heterogeneous background developed an independence
of SDirit which makes for first-rate guerrilla groups, but failed
to contribute any singular ideological indoctrination needed to
discipline and unify their actions.
7
trained :heir Indonesian officers Li
The Japanese, in particular,
command as independent
battalion commanders. Thus the army officer corps lacked in 1950
the training and habit of acting in accordance with broad strategic
8
plans worked out by a general staff.
Even during the Revolution the army officer corps was not
united.9 It immediately became involved in politics and because




Pauer, op. cit., pp. 186-136.
p. 209.
9. .
.:111 ,,r, 2E. cit., i • .3.
L3
of this its infl,..ence was 7egative and dispersed rathet than
positive and direct.i° Officers became satisfied with small
:afds, and tactical ohlectives. faflee
7o "cic e ranks" riee use their collective strength to create a
s-:rong efficient government. Moral deterioration and material
corruption set in to a certain degree.
11
Military men preferred
to negotiate as individuals rather than to coocerate toward a
e 7.1 -.ta'.(e was realized by Nasutin d):rinz
the lat.ter uart me rev)luticn it was too ]ate to unify. !any
weapons ,:ent on t":.e iac :arket, and a number of trained trcor.s
ioined :artisan ani-:. :'Jch 3f the country's potential officer
personnel had been diverted into politics, parliament, and civil
administration.
As Indonesian military policy developed, several beliefs
held by many influential citizens placed certain limits on it.
Generally, it was believed that Indonesia cwed its independence
to itself and to no one 4lse, and that all colonies in the world
should be freed. A strong belief existed in the legend of the
Just Prince Who would transform Indonesia into a prosperous and
42
happy world power. These beliefs contributed to a strong sense
of national importance.
A priority of tasks within this fledgling military
establishment was set up. First, internal pacification and
erant, :L. cit., p. 69,
11
Ouv J. Pauker, The Role of the Military in Indonesia
(Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, 1960), p. 25.
12
Miller, cit., 1,7. 3-4.
suppresicn was .to be accomplihe cf stabiliIv or
unity itf...- elf was second. The _
äS i -eccnoic
Engin.sel troops wouL. ui1 fca.2.s,':'L.es
was
and dams.
2. Military shop depots were to be models for
commerce and industry to emulate.
3. -::ere to or. 1,Eve 77 -1-c,ccts
and to be taught s-:11s which
when they returned civilian life.
The last priori - r the militar:- was ;71-,paration for defense,
which i;.cluded ez.tablishIng a body of doct.zine, establishin - laws
and star.daidized regulations, recruiting new blood for the armed
-7.
forces, and undergoing a military buildup.13
Throughout the revolution, although the army played a
great political and governmental role, there were frequent conflicts
between the civilian government led by Sul<arno and Hatta, and the
ar-ry. An attempt Was made in 1950 and 1951 to remove army
officers from participation in government and politics. Since the
army was not committed to civilian rule as the United Stgtes would
understand it, a compromise was reached, in which the army insisted
upon a cabinet role In exchange for removing army officers and
14




Feith, cc. ct., pp. 208-20(,:.
;. r.
Th Cct(.11'1 15:, an event occurred which reflects the




,:dkarta, was carrying out plans to modernize
he army. A group cf former guerrilla officers disliked the
Ice ,:niefle ,20ea; ,Te tneir inadequate training was reflected in
1
:e,]er the ee,, policies. 5-  Special
fel- example. A lcrge nu,:iber
c: f017,,:r rriila f!;.. .hters within the army feared the plan
cs1J .-in their rerval from the service when the strength of
army wculd be reduced from 200,000 to 100,000.
16
A political issue resulted because a Dutch military
mission was advising and aiding the Sultan in his plan. The
o-eponents of the plan charged that the army was losing its
revolutionary character and was acquiring a "colonial" status.
A rivalry between President Sukarno and the Sultan was a factor
at this time also, as Sukarno feared the role and ambitions of
the 1atter,
17
 When the issue came befcre parliament, arguments
to make changes in the Defense Ministry were raised. A number
of army officers petitioned Sukarno to dissolve parliament,
alleging that it was not representative because it had been
appointed by the several political parties. The Nationalist
15






party ,: cinitated this crisis on October 16, 1,752, by introducing
a resoltic,n in parliament calling for early withdrawal of the
•-en"t - -e
t.c.r changes in the t:_olo echelons of the La,e1—€.
Ninistr and the Armed Forces.
On October 17, the army organized a combination riot and
demonstration against parliament to demand dissolution of
p.carlia- nt and earL7 electins for a ncw 1:ationa1 Assembly. It
apt:caf- T th:.: a iAlitarv coup 1..d 1),y Colonel ilLeul ::asution, the
army coif of staff, may have been attempted here also. However,
Pr sidnt ..i:karno appeared Lefore the crowd and met their demands
in a most charismatic fashion, thereby suppressing the apparent
coup before it ever accomplished it.; purpose.
A few days after the October 17 affair, three territorial
commanders (in East Java, East Indonesia, and in South Sumatra)
were removed by subordinate officers, apparently in protest
against what they believed to be actions of the military clique
in Djakarta.18 The usurping officers declared allegiance to
President Sukarno while engaged in their acts of insubordination.
The government strongly rebuked the officers and promised to
"restore integrity and unity" in the armed forces. However, the
new chief of staff formally appointed them to the positions







As a result of this power struggle, Nasution was relieved
as chief of Htaff and a period of relative weakness and internal
di-
c„.
c,7r4:i to :Ise th::.
an n:slrlent of represion in.3tead
of allowing it to carry out a control function in support of the
established constitutional order. This appears to have been a
part of his overall plan to establish himself as a dictator.
- Octo1,1-, te F-,.2-:arnc to maintain
a controlling positic,n oases on n'irtured and manipulated
confusion.
20
The army continued to be involved in the struggle
for po-zer rather than to use its collective strength, to create
a strong efficient government. Su3.arno, fully realizing the
heterogeneous military and ideological backgrounds within the
army, used these differences to interfere with its internal affairs
and to prevent the army from taking any positive political action.
As the years passed, Sukarno's power became more and more
dependent upon a very delicate balance between the army and the
Indonesian Communist party, which grew to a strength of 2,500,000
in 1957,
21 
the largest :ommunist party in the world. The army
was occupied with efforts to resist these maneuvers of Sukarno's
while remaining, at the same time, deeply divided as a result of
personal jealousies, conflicting outlooks, and special interests
of particular officers. It became satisfied with small gains,
individual rewards, and the realization of individual tactical
20Pa,..ker, 2E: cit., p. 223.
21
Butwell, ar: Cit., p. 46.
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ob'lectives, rather than being cc.ncen,ed with idealistic goals or
achievement of political programs. The army drifted with the
_
There apioar!, also to have :eve1o;d a vE.r.v definite
collective reluctance on the part of the military to assume full
responsibility for affairs of state, although strong setrents of
the military urged that action he taken. Many reasons can he
7=ror thk nL1ctancc. The 1-1.,..a_y cause was
Indonesian cultuv,a, ralu ba7akism, which is an inherent religious
feeling of shame fcf an': action against the father figure which
is the symbol of the state.
23
In June, 1955, the cabinet of Dr. All Sastroamidjolo
a;-:cinled a very funicr colonel to the position c‘f chief of the
army staff. All of the army commanders throughout Indonesia
objected and formally requested that a clear dividing line should
be drawn between political responsibility and technical
responsibility with regard to the appointments to this important
position. This incident marked a clear change in emphasis in
policy. Up to this tire the army had been mainly concerned
with resisting external interference in it2 internal affairs.
After this period the army began to play an active role in politics.
On October 27, 1955, Colonel Nasution was reappointed chief of
22
Pauker, cp. cit., p. 201.
23,
.nterview with Howard P. Jones, U. S. Ambassador to
In6onesia, l':58-19E5, July 17,
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staff an,i he began a long-range program to strengthen the army's
role in the development of his country.
24
"arehr
mIlitary 7hared 1-es;3nibi1ity in the :f...-velotment
of its ccuntry.
President Sukarno continued to develop his plan for
political centralism. On March 2, 1957, his onponents proclaimed
a military regime in Ea,it in,lonesla. An ultimatum was issued to
the Sukarno government Its leader, and reaction stread through-
out the islands against "Javanese centralism" and communists in
the government. Increasing opposition in the outer islands (which
the government was - - ndent upon for taxes and large foreign
exchange earnings) forced out the All Sastroamidjojo cabinet in
March, 1957. Throughout this year repeated efforts were made
to effect a compromise between the central government and the
dissidents. Martial law was s proclaimed on March 14, 1957, giving
the officer corps import4It responsibilities for civilian affairs.
A national conference of army commanders was held in
September, 1957. An Effort was made not only to bring about
reconciliation between Sukarno and the dissidents, but also to
truly unite the army. The military participants in the conference
who included many rebel self-made "colonels," took an oath
pledging to obey unconditionally the decisions made by a commission




butwell, on. cit., p. 43.
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shment cf these "rebels" as we know it was never really
ccnsidereo. !:asution always was very careful to differentiate
cccur n ;omecne was disloyal -.3 1.he August, revtion.
Disloya_zy to the revolution occurred when oppositio to guided
democracy was advocated. He was very lenient with most rebels,
allowing many of them to resign an-I pursue other interests.
The take-over of Dutch prci.:.erties in Lecember, 1957,
resulting in the control of the economic life of the country at
large, gave the officer corps additional responsibilities and
the opportunity to acquire managerial experience. The formation
of a National Front in January, 1958, for the liberation of West
Irian with the Army Chief of Staff as general chairman and the
territorial commanders as local chairmen, provided the officer
corps with the task of organizing and directing a political
mass-movement. The military campaigns against the rebellion
in Sumatra and the Celebes in February, 1958, strengthened the
discipline of the army, improved the training of its officers
and troops, and forced the government to make resources available
for the increase and modernization of its equipment. Finally,
and most importantly, numerous conferences in 1957 and early
1958 under General Nasution's leadership began to create the habit
of joint examination of military, political, economic, ancl social





At the end GI Inden, in a state
of flux. However, the military had begun to assert itself and to
.f!-Ien17 2.cve -1,17nel- i. of themr..st
in r tne first time
in its young h5story the army peared to be taking an active
political role. It further appeared that the officer corps was
becoming motivated by a more commonly held political ideology,
which was still evolving, and which was coming to be held by an
Increasing majority of the officer corps. The army officer corps
loomed as one of the principle sources of political power and
administration capacities in Indonesia's future.
In 1958 army officers held one-fourth of the cabinet
portfolios in the government as well as a large number of
ether high positions of great trust.
27
They continued to be
radicals with puritan prejudices enforced by discipline, who
respected education and technology as ends to efficiency, but
distrusted journalism and politics as temptations to license.
They were sympathetic to tradition because of their role in
preserving and securing the state and their culturally-based
respect for authority.20
There was a very definite gain in unity during this period,
probably as a result of officer feuds being exhausted during the
numerous rebellions of the latter part of the period.
29
27- Aim: Information Service, The Current Indonesian National
i.rmy's Role in the Republic of Indonesia (Djakarta: Army Infor-
mation Service, 1961), p. 226.
28




The officers continued, however, to be intellectual captives
of the training that they received from the Japanese, in that they
'cit training concept.
This -,...- explain thrir revulsion against politicians and their
lack of real, purposeful united action.30
General Nasution embodied the general attitude of the
officer corps by thinking of himself and the officer corps as
watchdecs of the honor and dignity of the state.
31
Army officers
in various economic enterprises brought emphasis on a national
consensus, unity, obedience, and discipline.
32
On the other
band, the army developed baliwicks of influence, particularly in
regional governments (some refer to this as war lordism), state
enterprises, and matters directly affecting civil security.
33
So
close did some of the outer islands groups feel •to the army that
they pressed their political demands upon the central government
through the army, rather than through civilian channels, in this
period.34
The army's prestige had been increased along with its
political authority. It numbered 200,000 men. It saw its role
30Pauker, op. cit., p. 22.
31
 Grant, op. cit., p. 80.
32
 
Daniel t S. Lev, "The Political Pole of the Military in
Indonesiu," Public Affairs, XXXVI, No. 4, 351.
33Interview vith Ambassador Howard P. Jones, July 17, 1967.
34  Army Information Service, 2.a• cit., pp. 245-247.
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as an apparatus for maintenance of the nation's security and as
a functional group in bringing the revolution "safely to its
7Le army's revolutionary origins ard
operations against domestic political rebellions had made its
officer corps fully aware of national politics.
36
The officer
corps in general did net belong to traditional political interest
groups such as royal and tribal groups.
37
It was a non-
traditional group, and until 1956 had been on the political
defensive. By 1958, however, it seemed to have achieved some
measure of political sophistication and its control over most
regional politica: and army units was nearly complete.
38
With exposure to the world the officer corps was fast
becoming a military elite. A small number of officers had been
trained in Great Britain, India, Poland, Egypt, Czechoslovakia,
and China.
39
Many, quite naturally by this time, were being
schooled at their own Staff and Command School.
In summary, the causes defended and vigorously advocated
by the army in 1958 were as fo1lows:
40
3 5Ibid., p. 7.
36
37
Grant, op. cit., p. 66.
Grant, or. cit., p. 68.
38Lev, op. cit.
39
Pauker, on. cit., pp. 14C-153.
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°Army Information Service, 2.E. cit., p• 10.
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1. The constitution of the Republic
a. Establishment of a unitary and national state
which is democratic in form.
b. Establishment of a society which is just and
prosperous, materially, and spiritually.
c. Support for the creation of a peaceful and
perfect international world.






3. The policy of the state
The TNT would implement and put into peaceful order
the policy of the Republic of Indonesia as passed




An army can consciously affect the eccnomic, social and
political development of a new nation, without the use of force.
It is likely to be most effective if it is motivated by a single
unifying ideology.
Indonesia is not geographically unified. It is
culturally and socially unified only to the extent that its
varying peoples have undergone common commercial and other
experiences.
The colonial policy of indirect rule applied by the
gcvernment of the Netherlands failed to promote social unity or
economic integration. The Dutch underrated the native capacity
for self-rule apparently tbecause they did not know the people.
The most important Indonesian colonial legacy was a solid base
of wide holdings of land among indigenous peoples.
The Japanese contributed to the self-confidence of the
Indonesian officer corps and furnished some training for the time
when memLers of the corps would be in control of Indonesia. The
Japanese failed, however, to instill political sophisticaticn in
their officer trainees. Most of those who underwent Japanese
training were influenced by the Bushido concept of spirited warfare
and were not imbued with the sense of compromise which seems an
essential part of political administration.
55
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Because the officer corps was deeply involved in Indonesia's
struggle for independence, it became completely implicated in the
development of naticnal consciousness, thus becoming more
political-minded than members of the officer corps in old
established countries who take the concept of nationhood for
granted.
By the early 1950's the corps had become part of a small
elite, in close contact with civil servants and politicians.
Most officers 'ere well known to each other, and many had enjoyed
or would soon enjoy some additional comron experience of training
in a closed institution overseas.
In the next few years, personal jealousies, special
interests, war-lordism, moral and material corruption, plus
President Sukarno's influence, all contributed to negating the
effectiveness of leadership from the officer corps.
However, by 1959, the influence of the officer corps
became again more direct and positive because most personal
interests and jealousies were nearly exhausted due to the
overriding importance of defeating local insurgencies. The
success of these anti-insurgent efforts produced a commcn bond
among the warrior class. By this time, although the officer
corps was still to a limited extent an intellectual captive of
its Japanese training, its position as the watchdog of the honer
and dignity of the state, and as the protector of the revolution,
had become clarified as supremely important to its members.
0
APPENDIX I
THE MILITARY ORGANIC LAW OF 1954
Law No. 29, Year 1954
Concerning the Defense of the State
Republic of Indonesia
The President of the Republic of Indonesia:
Considering:
1. That the Indonesian People with struggle and sacrifice
have built the Indonesian State;
2. That the sovereiwIty, honor and importance of the
Republican Government furthermore must be defended against
menaces and invasions from any source;
3. That the aforesaid defense of the Government is the
right and duty of each citizen;
4. That it is necessary that principles for the regulation
of the defense of the Government be developed;
Keeping In Mind:
a. Articles 24, 61, 85, 101, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128 and
129 of the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia;
b. Article 89 of the Provisional Constitution of the
Republic of Indonesia;
c. Article 142 of the Provisional Constitution of the
Republic of Indonesia;
With the consent of the Peoples Representative Council of
the Republic of Indonesia;
Has Decided:
To Decree:




Taking part in the defense of the State, which means defending the
independence of the State and its territory, shall be an honor for
each citizen.
Article 2.
No citizen shall avoid taking part in the defense of the State except






The right to take part in the defense of the State shall be lost
whenever a citizen is convicted by a court of justice in connection
with an offense against the peace of the State.
Chapter II. The Character of Defense
Article 4.
The defense of the State of the Republic of Indonesia shall have a
character of regulated peoples defense and shall be carried out under
the leadership of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia.
Article 5.
The rights and duties of the citizen in taking part in the defense of
the State shall be performed under the following conditions:
a. The people, who shall be trained to carry out
resistance operations;
b. The Armed Forces, which shall consist of those who
enter it by voluntary agreement and those who enter it on a basis
of compulsory military duty.
Article 6.
1. The Minister of Defense is empowered to select any
citizen between the ages of 15 and 55 years to join in defense
training outside of his daily work, which will not cause a loss
of livelihood.
2. The aforementioned trainees noted in Paragraph 1 shall
not be selected if:
a. They are now or ever have been members of the
Armed Forces, whether voluntarily or by selection;
b. They are now or ever have been members of the
State Police.
3. Military training and everything connected with it
shall be regulated in accordance with law.
Article 7.
1. Preliminary military training concerning peoples
defense shall be carried out in the schools and other places of
e(!'ication.
2. The training noted in Paragraph 1 above shall be
regulated in accordance with law.
Article 8.
1. The qualifications for being accepted as a member of
the Armed Forces on a basis of voluntary agreement shall be:
a. Citizenship;
b. Being at least 18 years of age;
c. Healthy physique;
d. Having graduated from an elementary school or its
equivalent;
e. Never having been detained under dishonorable con-
ditions by any branch of the State by decision of a court of justice;
f. The right of becoming a member not having been lost
by reason of a decision of a court of justice;
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g. !'ever having received a prison sentence of more
than one year;
h. The fulfillment of other qualifications which
shall be fixed by Government regulation.
2. The Armed Forces shall fix its voluntary enlistment
agreement and everything connected therewith in accordance with law.
Article 9.
The seletees shall be chosen from among those persons who fulfill
the following conditions:
a. Citizenship;
b. Between the ages of 18 and 40 years;
c. Sound physique;
d. Not having lost the right to become a member of the
Armed Forces by reason of a sentence by a court of justice.
Article 10.
The selectees shall not be chosen from:
a. Those whose status is such that if they should be called
for military service, the result would be that difficulties would be
caused in the lives of other persons for whom they are responsible;
b. Those who hold a religious office or an office of a
humane nature whose doctrine does not allow it;
c. Those who are performing important State duties.
Article 11.
The performance of compulsory military training shall be in
accordance with law.
Chapter III. The Organization and Leadership of Defense
Section 1. Concerning the Position of the Government
Article 12.
1. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of the
:.rmed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia.
2 In the office aforementioned in Paragraph 1, the
President shall hold the highest authority over the Armed Forces
of the Republic of Indonesia.
3. All decisions of the President in connection with his
authority over the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia,
aforementioned in Paragraph 1, also shall be signed by the Minister
of Defense.
Article 13.
The Government shall fix public policy in the realm of defense.
Article 14.
1. The Ocvernment shall form from among the Ministers a
Peace Council which shall be chaired by the Prime Minister and which
shall have the duty of giving advice to the Government concerning
peace problems and the planning of the mobilization of all sources
of the strength of the State.
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2. The aforementioned Council noted in Paragraph I also
may Mve more extensive duties defined in accordance with
Government regulations.
Article 15.
The Minister of Defense shall fix policy and plans Lased on public
policy in the realm of defense, control their execution and be
responsible to the Peoples Representative Council concerning those
matters.
Section 2. Concerning the Armed Forces
Article 16.
The Armed Forces is the vanguard of the defense of the State and
of the training of the people for defense.
Article 17.
The Armed Forces shall consist of:
a. The Army;
b. The Navy;
c. The Air Force.
Article 18.
1. Each Armed Force shall be led by a Chief of Staff of
the Armed Force who also shall be Supreme Commander of the Armed
Force for up to a period of four years.
2. The Chiefs of Staff noted in Paragraph 1 above shal,
be appointed and discharged by the Go,/ernment.
3. At the end of the period of time noted in Paragraph 1
above, a Chief of Staff may be reappointed.
4. The Chief of Staff of an Armed Force shall be a Special
Advisor to the Minister of Defense concerning the creation, training
and utilization of his Armed Force and shall be the planning agent
for its creation, training and utilization as fixed by the Minister
of Defense.
Article 19.
1 Coordination between the Armed Forces shall be through
the formation of a Joint Chiefs of Staff which shall consist of all
Chiefs of Staff and which shall be chaired in rotation for a period
of up to one year by each Chief of Staff in accordance with
Government regulations.
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff shall be a Special Advisor
to the Minister of Defense concerning operational coordination
between the Armed Forces.
Section 3. Concerning Administration in Time of War
Article 20.
1. In wartime the Peace Council which was noted in
Article 14 shall become a Defense Council and also shall have the
duty of carrying out the authority of the Government as regards
defense.
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2. Changes in the administration of the Defense Council
shall be in accordance with Government regulations.
3. The Chairman, or if he is unable to attend, the Vice
Chairman of the Peoples Representative Council shall be required
to attend meetings of the Defense Ccuncil as an advisor and shall
receive notice of all decisions of the Defense Council.
Article 21.
1. In time of war all combat units of the Armed Forces
and peoples defense in general shall be led by a Supreme Commander
in accordance with appointments made by the Government.
2. The territory of the Republic of Indonesia shall be
divided into war areas; the combat units of the Armed Forces and
peoples defense in the aforesaid areas shall be led by a War
Commander.
3. The Supreme Commander and the War Commanders shall
be appointed and discharged by the Government.
Article 22.
In time of war the authorities of each Chief of Staff for t.)-.e
use of combat units of the Armed Forces which are fixed under
the Commander-in-Chief shall be vested in the Supreme Commander.
Secticn 4. Concerning the Government in Time of War
Article 23.
The connection between the military authorities and the Governme“t
in time of war shall be regulated in accordance with law.
Chapter IV. Rights and Duties of Members of the Armed Forces
Article 24.
The members of the Armed,Forces shall be officers, non-commissioned
officers and enlisted men who voluntarily or by selection become
members of the Army, Navy and Air Force.
Article 25.
At the time of becoming a member of the Armed Forces, a citizen
shall be required to take an oath.
Article 26.
A member of the Armed Forces shall have the duty of withholding
military secrets. This duty also shall continue after he is
discharged.
Article 27.
A member of the Armed Forces shall not be permitted to perform
political actions within the limits of a definition such that he




A member of the Armed Forces shall give advance notice to his
superior officer of joining any group, unless determined otherwise
by the Minister of Defense.
Article 29.
A member of the Armed Forces shall give advance notice of marriage
to his superior officer.
Article 30.
A member of the Armed Forces shall not take other employment outside
of his service without permission from his superior officer.
Article 31.
A member of the Armed Forces who leaves the Armed Forces under
honorable conditions shall be given preference in appcintments to
Government service and to private firms, whenever he has qualifi-
cations which are the equal of those of cther applicants.
Article 32.
A member of the Armed Forces who has left the Armed Forces under
honorable conditions shall be allowed to wear uniform clothing
with the symbol of his final rank in national or certified military
ceremonies which are fixed by Government regulations.
Article 33.
The President may grant honorary ranks in the Armed rorces to any
persons who are not members of the Armed Forces in accordance with
methods which are certified by Government regulations.
Article 34.
Other rights under justice of members of the Armed Forces shall
he regulated in accordanaie with or under authority of law.
Article 35.
1. The Armed Forces has its own system of justice and
commanding officers have the right to receive cases at law.
2. The regulation and authority of bodies which are
authorized to administer military justice in the broad meaning of
the term, military criminal, civil and moral law, including also
military disciplinary law, shall be regulated by law.
Article 36.
Demobilization, whether complete or partial, as well as all
ramifications of the aforesaid demobilization, shall be regulated
in accordance with law.
Chapter V. Declaration of War, Cessation of Hostilities, and Peace
Article 37.
The President shall declare war and arrange peace after receiving
the agreement of the Peoples Representative Council.
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Article 38.
The President shall carry out cessations of hostilities.
Chapter VI. Final Decisions
Article 39.
1. The Adminis, •tion of each Armed Force as it is found
to be at the time of ent,) into force of this Law, shall be fixed
until changed or modified by new regulations, within the intent
of this Law.
2. The intents which are found in other laws and
regulations wnich are in force at the time of promulgation of
this Law shall continue to be effective except as they are not
in accord with this Law.
Article 40.
This Law may be called "The Defense Law" and shall become effective
on the day it is promulgated, except for the intent of Article 35
Paragraph 1 concerning the receipt of cases by Commanding Officers,
which shall he(-ome effective when fixed by Government regulation.
So that each person may be enabled to know it, it is ordered that
the promulgation of this Law be entered in the State Archives
of the Republic of Indonesia.
Made official in Djakarta on September 3, 1954.






Legalized on September 6, 1954.
Minister of Justice
(Djody Gondokusumo)




KEY TO INDONESIAN LANGUAGES


































8. Lampung VI. Gorontalo group
9. Simalur 1. Bulanga
10. Nias 2. Kaidipan
10*. Sichule 3. Gorontalo
11. Mentawai 4. Buol
12. Enggano
13. Lontjong (along the
coast of Bangka)
VII. Tomini group
14. Lom VIII. Toradja group
15. Crang Laut 1. Kaili
2. Kulawi
IT. Javanese group 3. Pipikoro
1. Sudanese 4. Napu
2. Javanese 5. Badal-Besoa
3. Madurese 6. Leboni
/. Bare'e

















3. Kedang, Alor, and Pantar
group (on Alor some
Papual languages are also
spoken)
4. Belu (Tetum)
1. Eungku-Mori 5. Marae
2. Laki 6. Timor (Dawah)
3. Laiwui 7. Kupang
4. Landawe 8. Roti
5. Mapute 9. Wetar languages
10. Roma
XI. South Celebes languages 11. Kisar
1. Makassarese 12. Leti, etc.
2. Buginese 13. Damar languages
3. Luwu 14. Tanimbar languages
4. Sa'dan 15. Kai
5. Pitu-Uluna-Salu '6 Aru
6. Mandar dialects 17. Puru
7. Seko 18. Ambeldu
19. West Ceram languagesXIT. Muna-Putung group 20. rast Ceram languages
1. Muna-Butung 21. Goram languages
2. South Butung 22. Panda





4. Wolio and Lajolo 2. Sula dialects







B. North Halmaheran language
family (Ternate, Tidore, etc.)
C. Papual languages
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